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This report concerns the raupatu (confiscation) of Maori land in the Tauranga district, following the war of 1864. The report covers 55 separate claims. The claimants represent several iwi, including Ngati Ranginui, Ngai Te Rangi, Waitaha, and the Marutuahu people. The Tribunal's inquiry was not the first but it was the fullest inquiry into the confiscation that has ever been conducted. In contrast to the royal commission of 1927, which reported on the Tauranga confiscation and concluded that Tauranga Maori had not been badly treated, the Tribunal found that they have substantial grievances. The key findings of the majority report are outlined below.

War at Tauranga

The battles at Gate Pa (Pukehinahina) on 29 April 1864 and Te Ranga on 21 July 1864 followed on from the Waikato war. The Tribunal found that the Crown breached the Treaty in substantial ways by landing troops at Tauranga and attacking local Maori. This resulted in large-scale loss of life and property on the part of Tauranga Maori. The Crown then used the resistance of Tauranga Maori as an excuse to confiscate their land, breaching the Treaty obligation to allow Maori to retain ownership and control of their land. The Crown justified the confiscation on the ground that Maori were in 'rebellion'. However, the Tribunal rejected this justification because it failed to take into account the circumstances of New Zealand in the 1860s.

Loss of land

The report details the loss of Maori land as a result of raupatu. The entire Tauranga district, estimated at 290,000 acres, was included in the confiscation proclamation of 1865. Of this area, the Crown retained a 50,000-acre area known as the 'confiscated block'. Though the land outside the 50,000-acre block was returned to Maori between 1865 and 1886, most of this land was quickly lost from Maori ownership as well. The Crown purchased some 90,000 acres within the district known as the Te Puna-Katikati block and a further area of 'returned land', estimated at 75,000 acres, was sold to the Crown or private purchasers. By 1886, Tauranga Maori retained only an estimated 75,000 acres of relatively poor quality land and this was no longer held under customary title.

The confiscated block

The confiscation of 50,000 acres of land in the central part of the district, was a Treaty breach that was never really contested by the Crown in the Tribunal's inquiry. The Crown did argue that because the amount of land finally taken from Tauranga Maori was relatively small, little actual prejudice to Tauranga Maori resulted. The Tribunal rejected this and concluded that the Tauranga confiscation was a grave injustice on the part of the Crown, which has severely hindered the aspirations of Tauranga Maori since the 1860s. In particular, the Tribunal found that the hapu of Ngati Ranginui, who lived largely within the confiscated block, lost most of their land and have suffered deprivation as a result.

Te Puna-Katikati Crown purchase

In August 1864, in an effort to acquire more land, some Government Ministers took a number of Ngai Te Rangi chiefs to Auckland and persuaded them to sign a deed to sell the land from Te Puna through to Katikati. The chiefs of Ngati Pukenga, Ngati Ranginui, and Marutuahu, as well as many of Ngai Te Rangi, were not consulted and thus never agreed to sell their land in the area. Despite the protests of these rangatira, the Government insisted that the land had been sold. Some chiefs not party to the original transaction eventually got some payment but they were not allowed to keep their land. The Treaty of Waitangi promised Maori they could retain their land for as long as they so desired but the Crown did not allow Maori to retain Te Puna-Katikati. The Tribunal found that this, too, was a significant breach of the Treaty.

Returned land

The report also details the fate of the land returned to Maori outside the 50,000-acre confiscated block and the Te Puna-Katikati block. The Crown used land commissioners to ascertain rights to this land and returned it to them over the next 20 years. But it was returned in individual rather than customary title and could be sold to the Crown or Pakeha without the consent of local chiefs. All but some 75,000 acres was sold by 1886. The Crown took advantage of this situation to purchase some significant blocks of land including, even, the sacred mountain of Mauao (Mount Maunganui) - despite the protests of the leading chief of the area.

Conclusion

Tauranga Maori suffered considerable prejudice as a result of breaches of the principles of the Treaty arising from the Crown's confiscation, return and purchase of Maori land in the Tauranga district before 1886. It is the recommendation of the Tribunal that the Crown move quickly to settle the Tauranga claims with generous redress.

Minority opinion

One member of the Tauranga Tribunal - the Honourable Dr Michael Bassett - wrote a five-page dissenting opinion in which he takes issue with three of the general findings of the majority members. These are: that the Crown was not justified in taking military action against Tauranga Maori in the 1860s, that the Crown breached the Treaty by individualising the tenure of Maori land at Tauranga, and that the Crown failed to adequately supervise the alienation of returned Maori land. However, despite his dissenting views on these points, Dr Bassett concluded that the other Treaty breaches suffered by Tauranga Maori were serious enough to warrant generous redress from the Crown. He stated in his opinion that 'my conclusions do not warrant any lessening of the quantum of settlement made with Tauranga Maori'.

At the end of March 2004, the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and the Minister of Māori Affairs recognised the deed of mandate of the executive council of Nga Kaihautu o Te Arawa to negotiate the settlement of all of Te Arawa’s historical claims. Following that decision, claims concerning the planned settlement negotiations and the recognition of the mandate were filed with the Waitangi Tribunal and the claims were granted urgency. Judge Caren Wickliffe, John Baird, and Gloria Herbert were appointed to hear the claims (with Judge Wickliffe presiding), and a hearing was held in Rotorua in late June 2004. The Te Arawa Mandate Report was released in September 2004.

The report found that the Crown failed to carry out a sufficiently active role in monitoring and scrutinising the Te Arawa mandating process, or in assessing the executive council’s deed of mandate. The Tribunal concluded that issues of representivity and accountability with respect to the executive council had not been thoroughly or fully resolved.

However, the Tribunal stopped short of upholding the claims per se or finding that the Crown acted in breach of the Treaty causing prejudice, since an opportunity remained for matters to be put to right. The Crown had also indicated that it wanted to review the process by which the executive council’s mandate was achieved.

The Tribunal thus suggested that a hui be held of Te Arawa iwi and hapu representatives (elected members of the kaihautu) to debate and vote on issues such as the number of groups to be represented on the executive council, the proportionality of seats across the iwi and hapu, and the question of the degree of accountability of the executive council to the kaihautu.

The Tribunal stated that not only would the Crown be in breach of the Treaty if it made an inadequate response to the Tribunal’s suggested course of action but it would also risk promoting entrenched division within Te Arawa between the executive council and its opponents. Leave was granted to the claimants to return to the Tribunal if the Crown’s response was in fact inadequate.

The Tribunal also made some specific comments about particular iwi and hapu, such as finding that, many years after undertaking to do so, the Crown was both legally and morally obligated to enter into separate negotiations with Ngati Makino. The Tribunal found that this should occur at the same time as the negotiations with the rest of Te Arawa, and that, if Ngati Makino agreed, Waitaha should be invited to join these negotiations.

Finally, the Tribunal noted that claims such as those concerning the Te Arawa mandate would continue to be heard by the Tribunal from time to time. It thus provided some suggested best-practice guidelines which could be used by the Crown and Māori should they wish to develop a Treaty-compliant process for the recognition of mandates to negotiate settlements.

In the months following the release of the Te Arawa Mandate Report in August 2004, several requests for a resumption of the inquiry were made by claimants, on the grounds that the Crown had failed to make an adequate response to the Tribunal's suggestions.

In December 2004, the Tribunal agreed to resume the inquiry. A one day hearing was held on 12 January 2005. The Tribunal reported on the January 2005 hearing in the Te Arawa Mandate Report: Te Wahanga Tuarua, released in March 2005.

This short interim report concerns a claim about the polling arrangements for the 10 July 2004 Te Tai Hauauru by-election.

Addendum to the short interim report concerning a claim about the polling arrangements for the 10 July 2004 Te Tai Hauauru by-election.

The Tribunal's Mohaka ki Ahuriri Report was released on Saturday 5 June 2004. It covers 20 Hawke's Bay claims spanning a district bounded by the Tutaekuri River to the south, Hawke Bay to the east, the Waiau River to the north, and the inland ranges and the old Hawke's Bay provincial boundary to the west. The claimants were predominantly Ngati Kahungunu, although some identified more or equally with Ngati Tuwharetoa.

In summary, the claims concerned Māori land in two broad ways. First, they related to the loss of land through pre-1865 Crown purchases, the operation from 1865 of the Native Land Court, the 1867 Mohaka–Waikare confiscation, and later Crown purchasing (mainly conducted from 1910 to 1930). Secondly, they related to the barriers to the use and enjoyment of lands retained in Māori ownership, including title disruption, the lack of development opportunities, the fragmentation and multiple ownership of tiny parcels, and the lack of access.

In particular, the Tribunal investigated:

The status of the first land transactions with the Crown in the district in 1851, which the claimants asserted to be akin to ‘treaties’. Whether a supposed ‘rebellion’ justified the military engagements in 1866 and the confiscation in 1867. The propriety of the Crown’s handling of both the ‘return’ of certain lands after the confiscation and the title disputes which followed for over 80 years. The point at which the Crown should have stopped purchasing Māori land and put its effort into helping develop the remaining Māori land base; and whether there is a link between poverty and landlessness.

The Tribunal found a number of serious breaches relating to land loss and remaining Māori land base:

Overall, we have identified serious breaches of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Crown in the loss of Māori land in our inquiry district. We have also found that the Crown acted in clear breach of the Treaty in its treatment of the remaining Māori land base. We have also made the point that by far the bulk of that surviving base (some 125,000 acres out of a total of roughly 800,000) remains in Māori ownership principally because it was viewed by the Crown as too rugged and unproductive to bother purchasing.

Of particular note was the Crown's use of section 363 of the Native Land Act in 1910, alienating Māori land ownership:

from 1911 the Crown persisted over two decades in buying up individual interests in land, more than halving the amount of land left in Māori ownership at Mohaka in 1910. It adopted the usual tactics of employing alienation restrictions under section 363 of the Native Land Act 1909, as well as making payments on the basis of out-of-date valuations. This purchasing not only conflicted with the Stout–Ngata recommendations but seemed to serve no clear purpose. And, because the Crown had acquired so many partial interests, scattered throughout the various blocks, it decided upon a scheme to consolidate its interests. Even after this decision was made, however, purchasing continued unabated – in fact, the impetus for it increased, as the Crown tried to gain as much land as it could in the northern part of the Mohaka block, where the blackberry infestation was less, before the exchanges took place.

The Tribunal recommended that the Crown and the claimants negotiate over the settlements of the claims, and it made some suggestions as to the appropriate groups for the Crown to deal with. It also noted that Crown counsel had made a number of concessions of failings by the Crown to live up to the standards envisaged in the Treaty.

The Process to Date

This report is the outcome of an urgent inquiry into the Crown’s policy for the foreshore and seabed of Aotearoa-New Zealand. The many claimant groups represented in the inquiry comprised most of the coastal iwi.1

The urgent inquiry was sought after the Crown announced its response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Marlborough Sounds case.2 In that decision, the Court of Appeal departed from the previous understanding that the Crown owned the foreshore and seabed under the common law. This opened the way for the High Court to declare that Maori common law rights in the foreshore and seabed still exist, and for the Maori Land Court to declare land to be customary land under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.

The Crown supported the claimants’ application for an urgent inquiry, and the timeframes were all tailored to the Crown’s requests. The changing needs of the Crown meant that a proposed hearing in November 2003 was adjourned, and we made time available in January. We tried to balance the need on the one hand for claimants to have sufficient time to prepare for a very significant hearing, and the need on the other for our report to be available to Ministers before planned legislation is introduced. The result was that the hearing took place over six days at the end of January 2004, and we have had four weeks in which to produce our report.

Terminology

From the outset, it is essential to be clear what we are talking about when we refer to the foreshore and seabed. First, what is the foreshore? It is the intertidal zone, the land between the high- and low-water mark that is daily wet by the sea when the tide comes in. It does not refer to the beach above the high-water mark. The seabed is the land that extends from the low-water mark, and out to sea.

The need to distinguish the foreshore from the adjacent dry land and seabed arises from the English common law, which developed distinct rules for that zone. In Maori customary terms, no such distinction exists.

We wanted to take our language out of the English legal paradigm. We raised with Sir Hugh Kawharu, a witness in our inquiry, whether there was a Maori term that clearly embraced the whole of the foreshore and seabed. Te takutai moana was a term that he felt may be variously understood by different groups in different situations. To some, it had more of an inshore connotation, whereas others might understand it as also connoting the high seas. The word papamoana, meaning simply the bed of the sea, did not seem to be as widely used.

We have therefore reluctantly resorted to the English terminology, foreshore and seabed. We recognise, and chapter 1, ‘Tikanga’, makes it very clear, that this terminology is culturally specific.

The Context

The Government’s resolve to step in as soon as the Court of Appeal’s decision was released to implement another regime very quickly, combined with the apparently widespread fear that Maori will control access to the beach, has led to an emotional response across the whole country. It is necessary to have an understanding of complex legal concepts to discuss foreshore and seabed in an informed way. Perhaps that is why the public discourse has generally been so unsatisfying, oversimplifying the issues and thereby distorting them. It appears to us that polarised positions (not necessarily underpinned by good information) have quickly been adopted, and real understanding and communication have been largely absent.

 The Crown released the first version of its foreshore and seabed policy in August 2003. It elicited a storm of protest from Maori. In the following weeks, the Crown held a number of hui around the country to consult with Maori about the policy. We have heard a lot of criticism about the Government’s consultation, but we decided early on that we would not inquire into the alleged deficiencies of that process. We felt that to do so would only be to confirm what everybody already knew: the consultation process was too short; and it was fairly clear that the Government had already made up its mind. The policy was further developed between August and December 2003, but was not changed in any of its essentials.

 The Nature of our Task

In embarking upon our report, we are conscious that while it is our job to consider the Crown’s position on the policy, and the policy itself, in light of the Treaty, ultimately the Government is free to do what it wishes. Our jurisdiction is recommendatory only, and power to govern resides with the Government. We have no say in how much or how little regard is paid to our views. We hope that the Government will properly consider what we have to say and, if it is cogent, will be influenced by it.

As a quasi-judicial body standing outside the political process, we proceed in the expectation that governments in New Zealand want to be good governments, whose actions although carried by power are mitigated by fairness. Fairness is the value that underlies the norms of conduct with which good governments conform - legal norms, international human rights norms, and, in the New Zealand context, Treaty norms. We think that even though governments are driven by the need to make decisions that (ultimately) are popular, New Zealand governments certainly want their decisions to be coloured by fairness. In fact, we think that New Zealanders generally have an instinct for fairness, and that a policy that is intrinsically fair will, when properly explained, ultimately find favour.

We see it as part of our role in the present situation to ensure that the Government has before it all the matters it needs to know in order that its decision-making is fair. In the Waitangi Tribunal, consideration of what is fair is always influenced by the agreements and understandings embodied in the Treaty, but fairness in Treaty terms is not the only relevant norm. There is a fairness that can be distilled independently of the Crown’s commitments under the Treaty, and we think that wider fairness has relevance in the present situation. This is an important theme of our report.

The Policy

The Crown told us that:

    In brief, the Government’s policy seeks to establish a comprehensive, clear and integrated framework which provides enhanced recognition of customary interests of whanau, hapu and iwi in foreshore and seabed, while at the same time confirming that foreshore and seabed belongs to, and is in principle accessible by, all New Zealanders.3

We have closely examined the policy, and the Crown’s claims for it. We have been unable to agree with any of the Crown’s assertions about the benefits that will accrue to Maori. On the other hand, it does seem to us that the policy will deliver significant benefits to others - reinstatement of (effectively) Crown ownership, elimination of the risk that Maori may have competing rights, and the ability of the Crown to regulate everything.

As we see it, this is what the policy does:

    * It removes the ability of Maori to go to the High Court and the Maori Land Court for definition and declaration of their legal rights in the foreshore and seabed.
    * In removing the means by which the rights would be declared, it effectively removes the rights themselves, whatever their number and quality.
    * It removes property rights. Whether the rights are few or many, big or small, taking them away amounts to expropriation.
    * It does not guarantee compensation. This contradicts the presumption at law that there shall be no expropriation without compensation.
    * It understates the number and quality of the rights that we think are likely to be declared by, in particular, the Maori Land Court under its Act. We think that the Maori Land Court would declare that customary property rights exist, and at least sometimes these would be vested as a fee simple title.
    * In place of the property rights that would be declared by the courts, the policy will enact a regime that recognises lesser and fewer Maori rights.
    * It creates a situation of extreme uncertainty about what the legal effect of the recognition of Maori rights under the policy will be. They will certainly not be ownership rights. They will not even be property rights, in the sense that they will not give rise to an ability to sue. They may confer priority in competing applications to use a resource in respect of which a use right is held, but it is not clear whether this would amount to a power of veto.
    * It is therefore not clear (particularly as to outcomes), not comprehensive (many important areas remain incomplete), and gives rise to at least as many uncertainties as the process for recognition of customary rights in the courts.
    * It describes a process that is supposed to deliver enhanced participation of Maori in decision-making affecting the coastal marine area, but which we think will fail. This is because it proceeds on a naive view of the (we think extreme) difficulties of obtaining agreement as between Maori and other stakeholders on the changes necessary to achieve the required level of Maori participation.
    * It exchanges property rights for the opportunity to participate in an administrative process: if, as we fear, the process does not deliver for Maori, they will get very little (and possibly nothing) in return for the lost property rights.

Treaty Breaches and Prejudice

These are fundamental flaws. The policy clearly breaches the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. But beyond the Treaty, the policy fails in terms of wider norms of domestic and international law that underpin good government in a modern, democratic state. These include the rule of law, and the principles of fairness and non-discrimination.

The serious breaches give rise to serious prejudice:

(a) The rule of law is a fundamental tenet of the citizenship guaranteed by article 3. Removing its protection from Maori only, cutting off their access to the courts and effectively expropriating their property rights, puts them in a class different from and inferior to all other citizens.
(b) Shifting the burden of uncertainty about Maori property rights in the foreshore and seabed from the Crown to Maori, so that Maori are delivered for an unknown period to a position of complete uncertainty about where they stand, undermines their bargaining power and leaves them without recourse.
(c) In cutting off the path for Maori to obtain property rights in the foreshore and seabed, the policy takes away opportunity and mana, and in their place offers fewer and lesser rights. There is no guarantee to pay compensation for the rights lost.

Recommendations

When considering what recommendations to make, we were mindful that many of the claimants accepted that, realistically, there was no prospect of a regime for achieving te tino rangatiratanga over the foreshore and seabed. On the whole, their aspirations were more modest. Most agreed that they would live with the status quo, post-Marlborough Sounds. All, however, said that their most preferred option was for the Government to agree to go back to the drawing board, and engage with Maori in proper negotiations about the way forward. We agree that this would be the best next step, and that is our strong recommendation to the Government.

However, like the claimants, we have sought to be pragmatic. We recognise that the Government may not wish to follow our recommendation. So we offer for consideration further options that we think would ameliorate the Crown’s position in Treaty terms, and at the same time achieve the essential policy objectives of public access and inalienability. Our suggestions are premised on our view that (1) in terms of the legal status quo, the least intervention is the best intervention; and (2) it is critical that the path forward is determined by consensus.

Our Report

In many ways, the Marlborough Sounds case and the Government’s response to it has proved to be a catalyst for new thinking about race relations in our country. Some of that thinking has been positive, but much of it seems to us to have been negative. We recognise that the Government, in coming now to finalise its approach to the foreshore and seabed, has some very difficult decisions ahead.

We have had the opportunity to analyse the issues closely and dispassionately. We sit outside the political arena, so we can test the arguments for their cogency, and probe the legal concepts underlying them, in a way that is neutral but, we hope, rigorous. We were grateful that from the outset, the Crown was keen to have our input, recognising we think that the time for consultation had been short, and that the temperature of public debate militated against genuine exchange of ideas.

We come to these issues with a desire to make a positive contribution. We hope that our report will be of interest and assistance both to Ministers and to the wider public, and that it is not too late for more informed discourse.

The Petroleum Report is the outcome of an urgent hearing held in Wellington over four days from 16 to 19 October 2000. In the report the Tribunal, consisting of Chief Judge Joe Williams (presiding), John Baird, John Clarke, and Joanne Morris, addresses claims by Nga Hapu o Nga Ruahine of Taranaki and Ngati Kahungunu of Hawke’s Bay and Wairarapa in relation to their interests in the petroleum resource.

The report was written under urgency owing to the Government’s intention to sell the Crown’s interests in the Kupe licence. Because of that situation, the Tribunal reported in two stages. Part 2 of the report dealt with the regulatory framework and management regime since 1937.

At the hearing, it was common ground between the claimants and the Crown that, before 1937, land ownership carried with it legal rights to the petroleum in the land. However, the claimants argued that in the nineteenth century, and up to 1937, the Crown was implicated in many breaches of the Treaty whereby they lost most of their land and the petroleum that went with it. Then, in the Petroleum Act 1937, the Crown nationalised the petroleum resource, without paying compensation to landowners, and without making provision for the ongoing payment of royalties to them. This, the claimants said, was a further breach of the Treaty.

The question before the Tribunal was whether, if Maori no longer have any subsisting legal ownership in the petroleum resource, an interest of any other kind remains. The inquiry led the Tribunal to conclude that the expropriation of the pre-existing Maori rights to petroleum arose from a context riddled with breaches of the Treaty. The situation in Taranaki, for example, where most of the land was confiscated, is well known. The Tribunal reached the view that, where legal rights to an important and valuable resource are lost or extinguished as a direct result of a Treaty breach, an interest of another kind is generated. The Tribunal called this a ‘Treaty interest’.

When a Treaty interest arises, there will be a right to a remedy, and a corresponding obligation on the Crown to negotiate redress for the wrongful loss of the legal right. Importantly, the Treaty interest creates entitlement to a remedy for that loss additional to any other entitlement to redress.

In relation to the loss of the petroleum resource under circumstances that breach the Treaty, the Tribunal considered that separate redress was due to Māori. By ‘separate’, the Tribunal meant additional to that made for historical land loss grievances, and relating to the loss of rights in the petroleum resource.

The Tribunal considered that the claimants in these claims had a subsisting Treaty interest in the petroleum resource and that they were accordingly entitled to redress beyond that to which their historical land loss grievances entitled them.

Finally, the Tribunal examined the reasoning underlying the Crown’s view that petroleum assets ought to be excluded from settlements. The Tribunal concluded that this exclusion was in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and that the Crown’s remaining petroleum assets ought to be on the table in any settlement negotiations with affected claimants. The Tribunal’s conclusion in this regard had general application but applied with particular force in the case of Taranaki.

The Tribunal concluded by recommending that the Crown negotiate with affected Maori groups for the settlement of petroleum grievances and that it withhold the Kupe petroleum mining licence from sale until either a rational policy had been developed to safeguard Maori interests or the petroleum claims had been settled.

Heoi ano enei whakaaro o matou mo te kaupapa i whakatakotoria ki mua i to matou aroaro. E tautoko ana i tera rerenga korero kua whakawharikitia ki roto ki nga mahi a te Karauna mo nga kereme. Ko matou kei muri, ko te Karauna me te iwi Maori kei mua - ‘Ka tika a muri, ka tika a mua’.

Released in 2003, Te Whanganui a Tara me ona Takiwa: Report on the Wellington District is a report on 13 claims relating to the area covered by the New Zealand Company’s 1839 Port Nicholson deed of purchase, as extended in 1844 to the southwest coast. The inquiry area consists of the takiwa (district, or environs) of Te Whanganui a Tara (Wellington Harbour or Port Nicholson), including Wellington city and the Hutt Valley. The report deals with the complex process by which this land was acquired from Māori, and with issues relating to the administration and alienation of Māori reserves in the inquiry area.

The Tribunal originally constituted to hear the claims consisted of Bill Wilson (presiding), Professor Gordon Orr, and Georgina Te Heuheu, with Bishop Manuhuia Bennett joining the Tribunal shortly after the inquiry began, but Mr Wilson and Mrs Te Heuheu subsequently resigned from the Tribunal. As a result of these resignations, Professor Keith Sorrenson and John Clarke were added to the Tribunal, and Professor Orr took over as presiding officer. The claims were heard between 1991 and 1999. Sadly, Bishop Bennett died at the end of 2001, before the report was ready for release.

The Tribunal found that the 1839 deed by which the New Zealand Company purported to have purchased the Port Nicholson block was invalid, conferring no rights on the company or its settlers. However, from 1840, company settlers began arriving at Port Nicholson, and quickly came into conflict with local Māori, who discovered that land which they occupied and cultivated had been sold to settlers. Despite an investigation by a Crown-appointed land claims commissioner, which revealed many of the deficiencies in the company’s supposed purchase, the Crown agreed to a process whereby Māori would release their interests in 67,000 acres of land to the company in exchange for £1500 ‘compensation’. The Tribunal found that this process was deeply flawed, and was carried out without the informed consent of Maori .

Furthermore, in 1848 a Crown grant was issued to the company covering not just the 67,000 acres but the whole of the Port Nicholson block, said to contain around 209,000 acres. Māori retained only some 20,000 acres of reserves. This Crown grant deprived Māori of roughly 120,000 acres which they had never sold or consented to give up, and the Tribunal found this to be in breach of their Treaty rights.

Another issue covered in the report is the conflict over Heretaunga (the Hutt Valley). In the early 1840s, parts of Heretaunga were occupied by Ngāti Rangatahi and Ngāti Tama, who had close ties with Ngāti Toa of the Porirua area. Crown officials did not recognise the rights of Ngāti Rangatahi and Ngāti Tama in Heretaunga, where they were living on land claimed by the New Zealand Company and its settlers. Both groups were pressured into leaving the valley by Governor Grey in 1846, Ngāti Rangatahi leaving only under threat of attack by Crown forces. The Tribunal found that the Crown failed to recognise or protect the interests of Ngāti Rangatahi and Ngāti Tama, who were required to surrender their land without their free consent, and who received either inadequate compensation or, in Ngāti Rangatahi’s case, no compensation. In addition, the Tribunal found that the Crown failed adequately to recognise Ngāti Toa’s interests in the Port Nicholson block.

The report also deals with Māori reserves in Wellington. Part of the New Zealand Company’s original plan for the settlement of Port Nicholson was that a tenth of the land acquired by the company would be set aside as native reserves, which came to be known as ‘tenths’. The Crown subsequently assumed responsibility for these tenths reserves. Another category of reserves (known as ‘McCleverty reserves’ after the Crown official who set them aside for Māori) was placed under the direct control of Māori owners, and the bulk of the McCleverty reserves were later either sold or taken for public works. The tenths reserves, however, were administered by Government officials on behalf of the Wellington Māori who were the beneficial owners of these reserves. In 1851 and 1853, the Crown appropriated 23 acres of valuable urban tenths land as endowments for hospital, educational, and religious purposes. The Māori beneficial owners did not consent to these appropriations, received little benefit from the endowments, were not compensated until 1877, and even then received only inadequate compensation. The Tribunal found that these appropriations were in breach of Treaty principles.

For most of the twentieth century, the tenths reserves were placed under perpetually-renewable leases for 21-year terms, a system which effectively alienated this land from its Māori beneficial owners in perpetuity. Furthermore, the beneficial owners received below-market rents due to the setting of rents at a fixed percentage of the value of the land at the start of the 21-year term. This meant that rent could rise to reflect increased land values only once every 21 years. The legislation which imposed the perpetual leasing regime, without the consent of the Māori beneficial owners of the reserves, was found by the Tribunal to be in breach of the Treaty.

Other matters discussed in the report include the taking by the Crown of land for the town belt and other public reserves without the consent of, or payment to, Māori; the creation of reserves in Palmerston North for some Wellington Māori, to replace tenths reserves in Wellington which had been sold by the Crown; the taking of Māori reserved land for public works purposes; and issues relating to the management of Wellington harbour, including the reclamation of much of the harbour foreshore.

The Tribunal concluded that serious breaches of the Treaty by the Crown occurred in the Port Nicholson block, and that these Treaty breaches affected Te Atiawa, Ngāti Toa, Ngāti Tama, Ngāti Rangatahi, Taranaki, and Ngāti Ruanui. It recommended that representatives of these groups enter negotiations with the Crown to settle these Treaty grievances.

This report concerns a claim about the Government's proposed settlement with Ngati Tuwharetoa ki Kawerau.

This report is in response to claims relating to the development, finalisation, and implementation in the 1960s of the Tarawera Forest joint-venture scheme, a tripartite forestry scheme involving private enterprise (originally Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Limited), the Crown, and several thousand Maori. In essence, the claims assert that the Crown secured the involvement of the Maori participants in the scheme by means which were in breach of Treaty principles and which caused them prejudice. The relevant Treaty principles are those of active protection and partnership. The claimed prejudice is, first, the unnecessary and non-consensual loss from Maori ownership of more than 38,000 acres of land, including the sacred maunga Putauaki and, secondly, the loss of financial benefits that, it is said, should have been obtained from the joint venture by the Maori participants but were not.

The primary group of claimants (the Wai 411 claimants) represent the former owners of the 38,000 acres of Maori land and the current shareholders and debenture stock holders of Maori Investments Limited (MIL). MIL is a holding company created in 1968 for the specific purpose of administering the 10.8 percent stake in Tarawera Forests Limited (TFL) that was obtained by the former owners of the Maori land in return for contributing their land to the venture. Supporting the Wai 411 claim but focusing specifically on the loss of ownership of Putauaki were the Ngati Awa (Wai 46) claimants. The other claim reported on here (Wai 872) was made by an individual Wai 411 claimant during the course of the Tribunal's hearing.

A key feature of the Tarawera Forest joint venture was that ownership of the land contributed by the three venturers passed to TFL in return for a stake in that company. The claimants' land loss grievance rests on their view that the owners of the Maori land would have much preferred to lease it than lose title to it, and that a lease could have been achieved in place of the joint venture if only the Crown had acted consistently with its duty actively to protect Maori interests. Instead, the claimants allege, the Crown put its own interests ahead of those of the Maori landowners and secured their involvement in the joint venture by a variety of unfair tactics, the effect of which was that the Maori owners did not sufficiently understand or consent to the venture's terms. The sense of grievance that surrounds the loss from Maori to private ownership of such a large area of land, including the taonga Putuaki, is exacerbated by the fact that the Tarawera Forest joint-venture has proved to be a 'one-off' scheme. All other forestry projects utilising Maori land have involved leases, and some have enabled the Maori lessors to own the forest on their land at the end of the lease's term.

The claimant's second grievance is that the joint venture has not given to the Maori participants the returns promised to those who knew of it, let alone the returns that they claim would have been obtained if the venture had been negotiated fairly. At the heart of this grievance, too, is the view that the Crown put its own interests first and, by various unfair tactics, ensured that the Maori landowners became party to a venture on terms that were not to their greatest advantage.

The nature of the claims has required the Tribunal to undertake a detailed examination of the events surrounding the development and implementation of the Tarawera Forest joint venture. The first issue is the fairness, in terms of the Crown's obligations to protect Maori interests, of the process by which the joint venture was conceived and became a reality. The second issue is the attitude of the Crown throughout that process. We have found that the process followed in establishing the joint venture was inconsistent with what the Treaty principle requires of the Crown. We have also found, however, that the Crown was not motivated by bad faith in that process. Further, we are satisfied that the two claimant groups have been prejudiced by the loss of ownership of the former Maori land and the sacred mountain, and that the financial returns to MIL from the joint venture do not offset that loss. We are not satisfied, however, that the claimants have lost financial benefits due to them from their participation in the joint venture. Finally, we consider that the prejudice resulting from the loss of land ownership requires redress from the Crown, and we have made recommendations on that matter at the conclusion of this report.